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Aug., 1953
THE RIGHT TO WORK
KENNETH R. WHITING *
One of the most controversial issues that has followed in the
wake of organized labor's phenomenal rise to a position of emi-
nence during and since the war has centered around the much
debated right to work legislation. Although the American worker
has probably felt that he was heir to the right to pursue the
occupation of his choice since the yoke of English colonialism
was first discarded, there has been no positive manifestation of
the right in legislation and court decisions until the last decade.
Until then it was merely a privilege that nebulously but omni-
presently enveloped a people who, though suspicious of fetters,
are often too smug in their freedom. The industrial revolution
and collective security notwithstanding, a few were still confident
that the right was theirs when the gasping phantom that once
was King Industry and his strange new bedfellow, the individual-
istic toiler, sought to rouse it from its slumber to rescue the em-
battled bastions of free enterprise from the new ogre of the Sun-
day editorial pages, organized labor.
Congress turned a deaf ear to the rumbling from without, jbut
the halls of sundry state assemblies, which echoed the croaking
when it became a local clamor, rushed to the rescue in the name
of the public health, wealth, and welfare.
The result to date of the inevitable backswing of the pendulum
is that thirteen states have constitutional amendments or legis-
lation passed with the purpose of curtailing union security. Florida
passed a constitutional amendment guaranteeing the right to
work in 1944. Since then Arizona, Arkansas, Nebraska, and
South Dakota have followed suit. Legislation accomplishing ap-
proximately the same result has been passed in Georgia, Iowa,
Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia.
Although all of the states' laws are not identical in detail,
the one major provision that no person shall be denied employ-
ment because of non-membership in a labor union or organization
may be found in all of the legislation.
Some of the acts define the meaning of a labor union or organ-
ization. Most of them specifically outlaw provisions in contracts
entered into by employers and unions that make union member-
ship compulsory.
A violation of the act is made a misdemeanor punishable by
fine and imprisonment by most of the laws. Enforcement by in-
junction is afforded in four states' and an action for damages
is given to any person who is refused employment because of
non-membership in a union in three states.
2
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Arizona, Georgia, Iowa and South Dakota.
2 Arizona, North Carolina and Virginia.
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According to a recent survey by the Missouri State Chamber
of Commerce,3 the right-to-work laws of the thirteen states have
not proven uniformly practicable in actual application. Based
on the opinions of the labor commissioners of the various states,
it would appear that the acceptance of the laws so far as evi-
denced by public opinion and court litigation runs the gamut from
wholehearted support to grudging, temporary acquiescence. It
is undoubtedly too early in the respective and collective history
of the acts to gauge their effectiveness and feasibility. In some
states the legislation has had the expected opposition from labor,
and in others the attitude on the part of both labor and manage-
ment seems to be one of cautious acceptance. No information on
the decrease of union shop clauses in contracts involving purely
intrastate industries in the thirteen states is available at this time.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the right-to-work
laws of Nebraska and North Carolina on just about every count
upon which they might be challenged in 1949. 4 Justice Black
spoke for the court in an opinion in which it was held that they
do not abridge freedom of speech, the right to assembly does not
include the right to drive others from employment, they do not
unconstitutionally impair obligations of contract, they do not
deny equal protection under the law to unions as against employ-
ers and non-union workers, they do not deny liberty without due
process of law and they are not without the domain of legitimate
state powers if not in opposition to federal law. Justice .Frank-
furter stated that it should be up to the voters of the individual
states to have the final decision in such legislation. The desirability
of such restrictions on union security was not passed on by the
court, because it felt that such was a political question.
The Taft-Hartley Act does not exclusively occupy the field
in its entirety. It does outlaw the closed shop while permitting
the union shop.5 The Act further provides:6
Nothing in this act shall be construed as authorizing
the execution or application of agreements requiring mem-
bership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment in any state territory in which such execution
is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
In light of the pertinent provisions in the Taft-Hartley Act
and the decisions by the United States Supreme Court in 1949,
it appears that any argument pro or con that is directed to the
advisability of such legislation must be confined to the field of
desirable political action.
Experts (both legitimate and otherwise) have waxed hot and
eloquent in debates over the rejuvenated corpse of the individual
See "State Protection of the Right to Work," W. R. Brown, Labor Law
Journal. Jan. 1953, p. 32.
'Lincoln Federal Labor Union No. 19129 v. Northwestern Iron and Metal
Co., 385 U. S. 525; Algona Plywood and Veneer Co. v. W. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 301.
Sec. 8(a) (3), Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, as amended in 1951.
6Sec. 14(b), Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.
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working man in their zealous attempt to espouse or disclaim his
right to work. Some have likened compulsory union membership
to the yellow dog contract.7 One of the oracles has prophesied
that the inevitable result of union shop contracts will be a totali-
tarian state." The issue has been defined as one in which "America
is at the crossroads, (because) to freedom-loving people it means
the closed shop and compulsory unionism." 9
It has been said that the unions are attempting to establish
an extra-constitutional pseudo-political status in their fight for
the union shop. This is apparently based on an analogy between
their attempt to exact dues and the power to tax, which has always
been reserved to the state. It has also been said that the claim
that this right is necessary to give strength and stability to the
union is merely to plead expediency and to confess the failure of
the union to win democratic support.10
Many feel that such a limitation upon the individual's right
to work where he can find employment will lead to the undermin-
ing of our democracy. To bolster their contention that this right
is a "primary" right and not subordinate to the right to organize
and bargain collectively, they point with righteous indignation to
America's "spirit of democracy" and our "sense of fair play."
To further confuse the issue they quote ambiguous dicta from
U. S. Supreme Court decisions that are hardly relevant and that
were never intended to be stare decisis on the point at issue.1
Since much of the criticism directed toward the union shop
is tinged or pervaded with rank emotionalism, it is difficult to
separate the chaff from the wheat. In no other sphere of the
gargantuan struggle between management and labor is it as neces-
sary to discard the emotional surplusage and to pierce to the core
of the matter before the parties in particular and the public in
general can give direction and purpose to their myriad and often
conflicting views.
The proponents of right-to-work legislation have, to the
author's way of thinking, one (and only one) argument that can
be forceably submitted and maintained. This is the often repeated
charge of monopoly by unions. The statement that compulsory
union membership is espoused by labor in contradistinction to the
basic right to work is not supported by union activity, state or
'"Union Shop in the Steel Crises," Rev. Jerome L. Toner, Labor Law
Journal, Vol. 3, p. 589.
I Benjamin Fairless, in a radio address, "Your Stake in the Steel Crises,"
April 6, 1952, p. 9.
Clarence B. Randal, in a radio address, "These Are the Facts, Mr. Presi-
dent," p. 9.
"See "The Right to Work," George Rose, Labor Law Journal, Vol. 1, pp.
293, 295.
"An excellent, recent example of misquoting cited the following:
The very idea that one man may be compelled to hold his life, or means
of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere
will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails,
as being the essence of slavery. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
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federal laws, or judicial precedent. The union shop does not re-
quire compulsory membership, although it may require the pay-
ing of dues on the part of the worker to help bear the cost of the
activity which has played such a prodigious part in his economic
and social advancement in the past. The Taft-Hartley Act does
not require union membership. There are no court decisions in
point that set down an unqualified right on the part of the Amer-
ican citizen to pursue the occupation of his choice or to sell his
labor on his own terms.
The principle that the union shop agreement gives the union
a monopoly can be met with equally convincing arguments to the
contrary. The best rebuttal can be simply stated by declaring
that those unions that have had the benefit of union shop clauses
in their contracts in the past have not enjoyed a monopolistic
control over the supply of labor or over wages, hours, and condi-
tions of work. The employer has been free to hire and fire em-
ployees as long as he did not thereby "discriminate to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization." 12 The
monopoly control over wages, hours, and conditions of work has
never come from, and cannot come from, the union shop clause
in a labor-management contract. This control, which never has
merited the epithet "monopolistic", came solely and exclusively
from the legal collective-bargaining agreement and not from any
union shop clause in any contract.
There is no reason to suspect that this will not continue in
the future as it has in the past. To the author, it is inconceivable
that this fact, as evidenced by past experience, could ever be other-
wise in the future.
Thus, the right-to-work legislation that has so far been passed
is not directed toward the tool of organized labor that most merits
the charge of monopoly, the collective-bargaining power. The
American myth to the effect that the individual worker has the
unalienable right to work when, where, and on such terms as he
may wish is true only where there is no collective-bargaining agree-
ment. The irrefutable truth of this statement has been recognized
and given eloquent expression by judicial tribunals.
13
In passing I might comment that although the collective-bar-
gaining agreement might constitute a monopolistic control of hours,
wages, and conditions of work, it is a majority monopoly that
follows the time-honored principle of majority rule. "The im-
portance of the broad public purpose sought to be served justifies
the means employed." 14
It should be remembered that the right to join a union is not
the same thing as the right not to join a union. Nor is the right
not to join a union, if it exists, the same thing as the right to
reap the benefits of concerted action without meeting its attendant
12 Sec. 8 (a) (3), N.L.R.A.
"'J. I. Case Company v. N. L. R. B., 321 U.S. 322 (1944).
4 National Maritime Union of America v. Herzog, 78 F. Supp. 146 (1948).
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individual obligations. Critics of the union shop would do well
to remember that federal law compels every union that legally
represents the majority of the employees in a valid bargaining
unit to expend its time and money to obtain and retain rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment and conditions of work for em-
ployees working under the contract who will not join the union
in equality with those who have joined the union. Why can it be
said that it is unjust or inequitable to legally force and compel
those same non-union employees to at least offer to bear a fair
share of the cost of maintenance of the union that must work for
all alike?
In the last analysis, the controversy centering around right-
to-work legislation resolves itself into the problem of balancing
conflicting rights. Those reasonable restraints on the rights of
liberty and property that the common weal and general welfare
demand include the union shop. The author submits that the
right-to-work legislation is a wholly arbitrary and ineffective
deterrant to whatever monopolistic activities that organized labor
may be guilty of practicing. The author further submits that
unions should not be compelled to expend their time and money
for the benefit of non-union employees without the correlative
right of contribution from those who refuse to join their ranks
through either justifiable principle or dogged recalcitrance.
The unalienable right to work cannot be found in either the
natural law of our social, economic, and political web or the con-
stitutional and legislative canons that theoretically reflect the
mores of the citizenry. Some who in the not so distant past were
quick to tread upon the hand and spirit of the laboring man sud-
denly feel the clarion call to rescue him from the tentacles of the
one institution that has so effectively espoused his cause. Some
more cynical than the author might suspect that their motives
are not entirely charitable.
CASE COMMENTS
LABOR LAW: DISCRIMINATION BY EMPLOYER BE-
CA.USE OF UNION ACTIVITY-The ruling of the Colorado In-
dustrial Commission, which was upheld by the district court, was
affirmed by the Supreme Court when it ordered Bennett's Restau-
rant to offer reemployment and compensation for financial loss
to four waitresses who were discharged in violation of the Colo-
rado Labor Peace act.' The court ruled that the waitresses were
selected for discharge because of their union activity and to in-
timidate other employees from joining the union.
Bennett's Restaurant v. Industrial Commission, (March 23, 1953) Colorado
Bar Association Advance Sheet for March 28, 1953.
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